Nearly 18 million ornamental fish are imported annually under a policy based on an Import Risk Analysis published in 1999. Despite the biosecurity measures in place since 2000, there have been several incidents of exotic pathogens from ornamental fish affecting wild and farmed fish populations. These include atypical Aeromonas salmonicida, cyprinid herpesvirus 2 (CyHV2) and dwarf gourami iridovirues (DGIV). There is a need to acquire new knowledge to support policy reform as the ornamental fish industry advances and new pathogens emerge.
Project FRDC 2009/044: AAH: surveys of ornamental fish for pathogens of quarantine significance determined that ornamental fish with subclinical infections of exotic viruses were passing through quarantine undetected. This project provided scientific evidence that led Biosecurity Australia to relax the import conditions for goldfish as CyHV2 is now considered endemic. Also, DGIV was detected in all consignments of imported gouramis at an average prevalence of 19%. DGIV was detected in domestic fish populations at wholesale and retail premises and at one ornamental aquaculture facility. The project outcomes indicated that pre-export biosecurity measures (and associated health certification provided by exporting country authorities) and post-arrival quarantining of fish in Australia were insufficient to detect and prevent fish with subclinical infections of exotic pathogens from entering Australia.

There is little information available on other viral, bacterial and parasitic disease agents carried by imported ornamental fish. Specifically, there is a paucity of information available on parasites of imported fish and their potential risk to Australian industries and ecosystems. There is a need to determine whether pathogens of biosecurity significance associated with ornamental fish are entering Australia despite the import conditions.

In project FRDC2007/007 and previous studies it was determined that ornamental fish entering Australia may carry pathogens of quarantine concern, specifically gourami iridovirus (GIV) and cyprinid herpesvirus 2 (CyHV2). Ornamental fish are imported under a policy based on a formal Import Risk Assessment (IRA). On the 11/09/08 Biosecurity Australia announced the formal commencement of an Import Risk Analysis (IRA) under the regulated IRA process to review Australia’s freshwater ornamental finfish policy with respect to quarantine risks associated with gourami iridovirus (GIV). Australia has imported a large number of gouramis for many decades. The 1999 IRA considered several species of gouramis and concluded that specific risk management measures were required for these species due to biosecurity risk posed by iridoviruses, including GIV. Australia’s quarantine measures include that gouramis are held in an export premises for a minimum 14 day period prior to export, health certification stating that they are sourced from populations with no known significant clinical disease in the last six months, and that the fish are held in post-arrival quarantine for a minimum of 14 days. These are key features which need to be reviewed. Additional scientific data would enhance the review.

A second impact is that the developing Australian ornamental fish aquaculture industry may be at risk due to introduced pathogens. This is of particular relevance for goldfish, where domestic breeders claim that their stock succumb to diseases such as CyHV2 disease when brought into contact with imported goldfish in wholesale and retail premises. This disease agent was also specifically addressed in the 1999 IRA.

There is need to determine whether GIV and CyHV2 are in fact entering Australia despite quarantine practices, and further, to determine whether either virus is already established in farmed or wild ornamental fish in Australia.

This project relates directly to the FRDC VNN Research and Development Plan, to facilitate industry profitability, sustainability, growth and development. There is an overarching need to measure and then reduce the risk to fisheries and aquaculture sectors (including natural resources) associated with transfer of nodaviruses. The aquaculture industry is proactive and responsible (eg triple bottom line reporting) and wishes to manage risks based on sound science. Industry acknowledges a residual risk that cannot be controlled: virus prevalence in the wild and natural fish movements. However, there is an immediate need for industry to conduct business in the face of unknowns with respect to true disease status. While there is a need to ensure that infected, but apparently healthy, stock are not moved to areas that are considered free of the disease/disease agent, it is of fundamental importance for the sustainability of the barramundi aquaculture industry and developing species ventures such as Australian bass that stock are translocated. Current tests for determining disease status are considered inadequate, therefore biosecurity protocols in the short-term are required to address the risk of introduction of disease with water, broodstock and fomites. As new information becomes available through R&D, these protocols will be revised and improved as needed to improve biosecurity. In the meantime, protocols are needed to manage risks with incomplete information and without overburdening industry with uneconomic or unwarranted requirements. There is need for mitigation of impacts on translocation: hatchery to nursery to grow-out; hatchery to wild (eg stocking for recreational fishing); both intra-state and interstate translocations, access to overseas markets; sourcing broodstock from the wild. Financial impacts, environmental impacts and mulitsectorial impacts at level of commercial, recreational and regulatory sectors all need to be addressed.