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Adoption
PROJECT NUMBER • 1989-120
PROJECT STATUS:
COMPLETED

Research project grant for postgraduate students in fisheries technology

The Australian and New Zealand Southern Trawl Fisheries Conference was held at the World Congress Centre in Melbourne from the 6th to the 9th of May, 1990. The conference was organised by the Bureau of Rural Resources and the Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics. Initial planning...
ORGANISATION:
Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (DAFF) ABARES
Blank
PROJECT NUMBER • 2012-719
PROJECT STATUS:
COMPLETED

SCRC: RTG: Hands-on operational experience and training at the Port Stephens Research Institute (PSRI) marine finfish hatchery, Port Stephens Fisheries Institute, Taylors Beach, NSW (Fisheries Technician: Trevor Borchert, DEEDI)

This grant provided the opportunity to broaden both knowledge and practical skills through gaining experience with new species and hatchery techniques in a premiere aquaculture research facility. The grant recipient travelled to Port Stephens Fisheries Institute (PSFI) for one week from 19-24...
ORGANISATION:
Department of Agriculture and Fisheries Brisbane

Assessing the effectiveness of the Southern Bluefin Tuna management scheme and its effect on those involved in the industry at the time of its introduction

Project number: 1986-052
Project Status:
Completed
Budget expenditure: $0.00
Organisation: Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (DAFF) ABARES
Project start/end date: 28 Dec 1987 - 31 Dec 1987
Contact:
FRDC

Objectives

1. Assess the effect and effectiveness of the Southern Bluefin Tuna management scheme so far
2. In light of likely developments, by examining changes since quotas introduced and assessing effect on outgoers from SBT fishery and on other fisheries

Final report

ISBN: 0 644 09692 6
Author: Gerry Green and Mark Nayar
Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

Final Report • 35.98 MB
1986-052-DLD.pdf

Summary

Individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) were allocated to fishermen in the Australian southern bluefin tuna fishery in 1984. The profitability of the industry increased substantially as a result. This is despite the total Australian catch being halved between 1984 and 1987 due to a decline in the abundance of southern bluefin tuna. The ITQ management system in the fishery was the first in Australia and was amongst the first in the world. Its introduction marked a radical departure from traditional management regimes based on limiting the number of boats allowed to operate and other controls on fishing inputs. These traditional method were, both in Australia and elsewhere, often ineffective in controlling the growth of fishing effort and in generating sustainable long term benefits. A lack of adequate property rights for fishermen over fish stocks has been identified as the major underlying cause of the overexploitation of marine fisheries. By giving fishermen more clearly defined long term property rights in the form of ITQs, incentives for fishermen to conserve the fish stock and to maximise their cost efficiency of harvesting are strengthened. Unprofitable fishermen who wish to leave the industry can sell their quotas to more efficient operators capable of earning a higher return on each tonne of fish caught. In this way the overall profitability of the industry can be improved. ITQs could be suitable for use in some other fisheries, so their success in improving the economic performance of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is likely to influence the future direction of fisheries management in Australia.

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