As stated in the call for proposals, the implementation of individual tradeable quota (ITQ) in Australian fisheries has brought about many demonstrable gains (e.g. increased capacity utilisation and profit). At the same time, there have been some social, economic and environmental consequences associated with the move to tradeable fishing rights that, even if predictable, may have been unintended. For example, ITQ markets have not always operated as envisaged; thin markets (few buyers and sellers), high transactions costs and the de-coupling of the ownership of quota from fishing practice may have undermined the performance of some ITQ systems. Ownership of quota by processors, exporters and others further along the value chain has also distorted the price incentives in some fisheries. In others, non-fisher quota ownership has resulted in a lease-dependent component of the fishery that are not capturing the benefits generated by the ITQ system. Changing quota ownership characteristics also have an impact on the configuration of industry representatives on co-management committees. It is not yet clear what the longer term impact of this is on stewardship and the decision making process and ultimately on management outcomes. As the extension of ITQs in Australia to a greater number of commercial fisheries, and potentially to support inter-sectoral allocations, is contemplated there is a need to learn from experience of ITQs both in Australia and internationally

ITQs globally have come under intense scrutiny in the fisheries management and economics literature. Synthesising and critically analysing learnings from these studies, as well as relevant knowledge from individuals/groups/organisations involved in the administration of, or affected by, existing ITQ systems will help identify key issues and, where possible, reforms that through adaptive management can improve the performance of existing markets and inform the design of new tradable rights markets.