Assessing the biosecurity risk of uncooked whole and eviscerated barramundi and grouper in relation to exotic viruses
The Australian farmed Barramundi is estimated at over $37.1 million AUD with a production of over 3,772 tonnes annually (Savage, 2015). The value of the wild-catch sector was estimated to be $9.9 million AUD with 1,073 tonnes produced (Savage, 2015). These sectors of the industry as well as recreational and Indigenous fishers, are all at risk of being exposed to hazards potentially introduced by imported Barramundi and grouper products, which could pose significant consequences. The Australian Federal Department of Agriculture does not consider there is sufficient evidence to suggest that the import conditions for uncooked barramundi do not effectively manage the risk of pests and diseases of concern arriving in Australia. Until further evidence is generated to demonstrate that importation of uncooked barramundi products poses a risk that exceeds Australia's Appropriate Level of Protection, then regulatory actions to mitigate these perceived biosecurity risks are unlikely to be implemented. Risk mitigation requirements for importation of whole farmed barramundi include that the exporting country must, among other things, declare it has in place health surveillance and monitoring and that the fish were not derived from a population slaughtered as an official disease control measure. However, this self-declaration is not supported by rigorous testing to ensure compliance. There are current and have been no previous protocols in place to test for the target iridoviruses in imported barramundi and grouper product, so the efficacy of the existing import controls has not been subject to assessment at retail level. Sampling at retail outlets of uncooked whole and eviscerated barramundi and grouper commodities is proposed in order to better assess the efficacy of import conditions. This project will focus on determining the presence or absence of exotic virus genetic material in imported uncooked potential high risk barramundi and grouper commodity. Should any positive genetic material be detected confirmatory re-testing will be performed in order to reduce the risk of a false positive PCR test result and a subsequent project will be prepared o
Final report
National Carp Control Plan - Biosecurity Strategy for the Koi (Cyprinus carpio) industry
Cyprinid herpesvirus 3 (Koi herpesvirus, KHV, CyHV-3) is a major disease in koi and carp. In recent years, CyHV-3 has been explored as a possible biocontrol measure for European carp in Australia. This virus was first detected in the United States of America in 1998 and has been detected in various countries including: Canada, Indonesia, Japan, Taiwan, Thailand, Poland (Hendrick 2000; Pokorova 2005; Garver 2010; Tu 2004; Sano 2004; Bergmenn 2006).
The potential release of CyHV-3 into Australian waters will introduce new risks to Australia’s koi industry. Mass mortalities of up to 100% have been described for fish infected with CyHV-3 (Hedrick 2000). Due to the potential severity of the disease, it is important to appreciate the risk factors and all potential biosecurity control measures available for the Australian koi industry and review their likely efficacy, prior to considering release.
The diversity of the koi industry in Australia spans beyond dedicated farms, to hobbyists and koi shows. The type, cost and applicability of all biosecurity measures to all sectors of the koi industry requires careful assessment in the formulation of a biosecurity strategy.
Final report
Australia. This virus is an OIE listed disease that at this time remains exotic to Australia. The potential
release of CyHV-3 into Australian waters would introduce new risks to Australia’s koi industry. The
development of feasible biosecurity measures is important in preventing CyHV-3 entry into naïve
populations of koi which is known to cause mass mortalities of up to 100%. This report focuses on
biosecurity measures that can be applied on four different levels: incoming risks for pathogen entry onto
a koi facility, risks for pathogen spread within a koi facility, outgoing risks for pathogen entry onto a koi
facility, and risk of pathogen entry at a koi show/auction.
Research to provide data to support application for a minor use permits for chemicals including trichlorfon, chlorine, copper sulfate, hydrogen peroxide, benzylkonium chloride for control of disease including White Spot Syndrome Virus (WSSV) in Australian prawn farms.
Assessment of Frozen Uncooked Imported Prawns for Antimicrobial-Resistant Micro-organisms of Aquaculture and Public Health Significance and residues of Ag-vet chemicals
Testing retail commodities for the presence of Taura Syndrome Virus and Yellow head Virus I
Assessing compliance and efficacy of import conditions for green (raw) prawn in relation to White Spot Syndrome Virus (WSSV)
Data is needed to assess the efficacy of the existing import controls. Australia's post-border testing and inspection measures on imported prawn commodities have not been subject to assessment of their efficacy in preventing WSSV stock reaching Australian retail outlets.
In light of the recent outbreak, a review of the application of protocols is warranted. Data is required to understand the extent of inspection processes for illegal prawn commodity importation, which may bypass the import testing protocols.